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Avoiding
a Nuclear Trade War:
Strategies for Retaining Tax Incentives
for U.S. Corporations in a Post-FSC
World
ABSTRACT

On January 14, 2002, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Appellate Body affirmed that the FSC Repeal and
ExtraterritorialIncome (ETI) Exclusion Act, a replacement for
the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) Act, was an unlawful
export subsidy under WTO agreements. Though the European
Union has indicated a willingness to wait before imposing the
largest trade sanctions in the history of the WTO, it insists that
the United States comply with the ruling. This Note explores
the history of the conflict and considerpossibilitiesfor the future
of internationaltrade taxation.
This Note first examines the background to the conflict,
beginning with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
conflict over domestic internationalsales corporations (DISCs).
After years of haggling, the United States replaced DISCs with
FSCs in 1986. Following many years without dispute over the
issue of how the United States would tax its imports, the
European Union challenged the FSC system in 1997 and
prevailed before the WTO Panel.
This Note then examines the two most recent decisions
regarding the FSC-ETI laws. The WTO Panel and Appellate
Body have both concluded that the laws are impermissible
because they constitute a foregoing of revenue otherwise due to
the government that was based on export performance. Both
bodies also rejected the defense that the laws are permissible
because they help companies avoid double taxation.
The length of the dispute and the high financial stakes
have made this battle particularly bitter. Further, the impact
on trade and the U.S. economy would be enormous, which has
furthered the tensions between the parties. The European Union
has said it may forego the sanctions altogether if the United
States complies with the WTO ruling. The United States should
not test the European Union by refusing to comply. Still, the
United States justifiably has serious concerns about bending to
the will of the WTO and changing its preference on taxation
1349
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systems based on a Geneva edict. In light of these concerns, this
Note concludes by exploring potential solutions for the problem
and recommending one course for changing U.S. law. This
option will maintain competitiveness and national sovereignty,
and still meet international obligations. This Note advocates
adopting an excise tax system on exported products to maintain
the tax system that the United States has chosen while
complying with the WTO mandate.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On August 20, 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
decided a two-year battle between the European Union and the
United States by declaring that the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion Act of 2000 (hereinafter EIEA or Replacement
Law), a U.S. law allowing U.S. companies to receive a tax break
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through foreign sales corporations (FSCs), was an impermissible
subsidy on exports.' Consequently, the WTO has authorized the
European Union to impose four billion dollars in trade sanctions on
the United States in response. 2 The United States claimed that the
3
sanctions, if imposed, should be worth about $956 million but no
more than $1.1 billion. The United States contended that the figure
'4
The
endorsed by the European Union was "somewhat high.
European Union countered that the amount it requested was "rather
conservative. '5 On August 30, 2002, the WTO accepted the EU's6
proposed amount and authorized four billion dollars in sanctions.
These sanctions would not be exercised to force corporations that
received the benefit to make payments to the European Union;
rather, the sanctions would serve as reprisals against any U.S.

World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Tax
1.
Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001), available
at 2001 WL 967462 [hereinafter Tax Treatment I] (ruling on the permissibility of FSC
Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Law of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114
Stat. 2423 [hereinafter Replacement Law]). As with most WTO decisions, finality was
fleeting as the United States appealed the decision on October 10, 2001. Washington
Appeals Against WTO FSC Ruling, EUR. REP., Oct. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL
Although the Replacement Law refers to export subsidies as
26061974.
Extraterritorial Income (ETI), they are popularly known as Foreign Sales Corporations
(FSCs). Trade Scene: Trade Policy Alphabet Soup Stew, J. OF COM.-JOC ONLINE, Apr.
5, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Jcm File.
America's Taxing Trade Troubles, ECONOMIST GLOBAL AGENDA, Aug. 21,
2.
2001, LEXIS, News Library, Econ File. See also Washington Appeals Against WTO
FSC Ruling, supra note 1. The United States challenged the amount of the sanctions,
claiming that the European Union calculated the figure based on domestic tax rates,
whereas the WTO ruled that the figure should be calculated based on the rate of tax on
foreign source income. US Says 'No Real Significance' to EU Claim Tax Row Valued at
4 Bln USD, AFX-AsiA, Feb. 11, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Afxasi File. The WTO
Ruling Panel consists of Crawford Falconer of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (a former New Zealand trade diplomat); Didier
Chambovey, a Swiss trade diplomat; and Seung Wha Chang of Seoul National
University, South Korea. See Warren Giles, Germany's Mueller Opposes EU Rush to
Trade Sanctions on U.S., BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 15, 2002, LEXIS, News Library,
Allbbn File. There is no deadline for the European Union to request authority to
impose sanctions, nor is there a deadline for the European Union to impose authorized
sanctions. WTO's ExtraterritorialIncome Decision: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 13-14 (2002) (statement of Peter Davidson, General
Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) [hereinafter WTO's Extraterritorial
Income Decision].
Edward Alden, U.S. Disputes EU Claim in Spat over Export Subsidies, FIN.
3.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at 10.
Trade, NAT'L J.'s TECH. DAILY, Feb. 11, 2002, at http://nationaljournal.com/
4.
The United States believes that the sanctions endorsed by the
pubs/techdaily.
European Union are high, even assuming that the EU's methodology for calculation is
correct. Id.
Taxes, NAT'L J.'S TECH. DAILY, Feb. 15, 2002.
5.
Frances Williams, WTO Arms Europeans with Weighty Weapon, FIN.
6.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2002, at 5.
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industries that the European Union may choose. 7 The European
Union plans to delay sanctions as of now but has reserved the right to
impose them at a later date, choosing to exact the punishment on
industries such as agriculture and machinery. 8 The United States
decided to appeal the decision, hoping that the WTO Ruling Panel
would reverse the Appellate Body's decision and save the tax scheme
used by many U.S. corporations. 9 The Panel affirmed the decision
that the tax plan was illegal on January 14, 2002, and compliance is
now the key issue in the long battle.1 0
There is still hope for corporations to receive tax benefits for
their export operations. While the United States may not wish to go
through another round of revisions,1 1 the elimination of the FSC
Replacement Law provides an opportunity for the United States to
undertake full-scale reform of portions of the tax code that affect
trade. 12 The Replacement Law contained flaws that made it more
objectionable to international trade organizations than the original
law. 13 The key objective is to "prevent the development of an

7.
Hearing on the President's Trade Agenda Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 107th Cong. 30 (2002) (testimony of U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick).
8.
America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 2. Germany's Economics
Minister stated that "[s]peculating about sanctions isn't helpful.... An escalation of
the row neither helps the European Union nor the U.S." Giles, supra note 2.
Germany's economy is the largest in the European Union. Id. See also Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. (2002) (Hearing On Trade NegotiationsFeb. 6, 2002), available at http://finance.senate.gov (statement of Robert Zoellick).
9.
Trade Representative to Appeal WTO Ruling against US Tax Policy, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11, 2001, at B2. See also Experts Advise What to Do Now that WTO Has
Shot Down FSC Replacement Act, MANAGING EXPORTS, Sept. 2001, at 5 (stating that
there are 6000 U.S. corporations with FSCs that are worth four billion dollars in tax
benefits to their parent corporations). The appeal was argued by Deputy Treasury
Secretary Kenneth Dam and Kent Jones, assistant to the solicitor general. Deputy
Treasury Secretary to Argue FSC Case at WTO, NAT'L J.'s CONGRESSDAILY, Nov. 6,
2001, available at http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily.
10.
EU says U.S. Must Comply with WTO Ruling on Corporate Subsidies,
DEUTSCHE-PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 14, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, DPA File; see also
U.S. to Cooperate with EU after WTO Tax Ruling, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 14,
2002, 2002 WL 2316578.
11.
Trade Representative to Appeal WTO Ruling Against US Tax Policy, supra
note 9; see also Curt Anderson, Treasury: Trade Tax Breaks to Continue for U.S. Firms,
AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Feb. 24, 2000, at D8 (stating that Congress was reluctant to
go through the time-consuming process of changing the law).
12.
A Subsidy by Any Other Name, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at A20
(proposing that now is the time to reform the tax code).
13.
Paul R. McDaniel, Panel IV." The Pursuit of National Tax Policies in a
Globalized Environment: Principal Paper: Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
1621, 1629 (2001) (outlining problems with the FSC provision of the U.S. tax code).
Such provisions included a general deviation from the practice of taxing and then
providing credit, and a clause that allowed FSCs to conduct all of their business within
the United States. Id.
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international double standard that will disadvantage the United
States and, in the end, cripple the WTO. ''14 With careful revisions,
the U.S. Congress can retain the tax incentives for domestic
corporations operating abroad while appeasing the European Union
and the WTO.
The United States, in dealing with the FSC problem, cannot
afford to suffer the potential consequences of non-compliance, nor can
it depend on amicable negotiations. Rather, it is crucial that the
United States devise a tax plan that will safeguard the interests of
U.S. corporations while mollifying the European Union. These
interests must be balanced with sovereignty concerns, requirements
of the WTO agreements, and worries about future challenges to laws
affecting international trade-both those to be brought by the United
States and those to be brought against the United States. Given
President Bush's decision this year to impose tariffs on steel, 15
causing a major stir in the European Union, 16 the United States must
make every effort to allay the fears of EU leaders and come into
compliance with the WTO decision. The implications of this conflict
cannot be taken lightly, especially in a time of war and economic
uncertainty. If mishandled or ignored, the squabble over FSCs could
17
erupt into an entirely different kind of battle.
This Note examines the background of the tax scheme, from the
inception of the domestic international sales corporation (DISC) to
the ultimate legislation embodied in the 2000 Replacement Law that
allowed for the tax exemption on extraterritorial income. It then
considers the impact of the WTO decision on foreign trade and on
competition abroad. It also evaluates the implications of potential
reprisal by the European Union. Finally, this Note analyzes several
proposals for retaining the tax benefits in the post-FSC world to
ensure competitiveness of U.S. exports, compliance with the WTO
decision specifically and international obligations generally, and
preservation of national sovereignty with respect to U.S. choices
regarding taxation of its citizens.

14.
John Van Oudenaren, E PluribusConfusio: Living with the EU's Structural
Incoherence, NAT'L INT., at 34 (2001). See also Heather Stewart & Ian Black, Dollars
4bn Sanctions Threat to US, GUARDIAN, Jan. 15, 2002, at 21, 2002 WL 9513394
(quoting Confederation of British Industry spokesman Gary Campkin: "Unless calm
heads prevail, there is a real danger of significant damage-not just to transatlantic
relations but to the WTO itself.").
15.
Tina-Marie O'Neill, US Steel Tariff Exposes Tension with EU Alliance,
SUNDAY Bus. POST (IRELAND) ONLINE, Mar. 10, 2002, at http://thepost.ie.
16.
Id.
17.
EU Trade Commissioner. Pascal Lamy has said he believes that the
situation will be resolved without trade war. EU's Lamy Expects Tax Dispute with US
to Be Resolved without Trade War, AFX-EuR. Focus, June 21, 2002, LEXIS, News
Library, Afxef File. However, the United States should still be prepared for the
possibility that negotiations will fail.
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II. BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT-THE FSC-ETI CHALLENGES
While the U.S. government taxes the foreign income of its
taxpayers, the European Union does not. 18
To offset this
disadvantage and maintain the competitiveness of its products in the
global market, the U.S. government developed the foreign sales
corporation (FSC) to provide tax benefits for corporations operating
abroad. 19 The stated purpose of the FSC was to "promote exports" of
the goods of the parent company.2 0 Small exporters and large
corporations alike used FSCs for tax purposes. 21 Popular locations
22
for these companies were Caribbean countries, such as Bermuda.
The parent corporation sold the product to be exported to the FSC,
who sold the product to the purchaser.2 3 The FSC, however,
24
contracted the shipping of the product out to the parent corporation.
U.S. corporations benefited from the FSC scheme. 25 In 2000, for
example, Boeing saved $291 million in taxes through its offshore
company.2 6 General Electric saved $746 million; Motorola saved $378
million from 1991 to 1998.27 The rebates were also important to
28
many chemical companies.
The European Union challenged the legislation before the WTO
in 1998.29 It characterized the competitive disadvantage suffered by

18.
Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2000, 18 ARIZ. J. INTIL & COMP. L.
1, 53 (2000).
19.
Anderson, supra note 11. Interestingly, some European corporations such
as British Petroleum (England), BASF (Germany), and Rhone Poulenc (France) have
also used the FSC benefit. Bhala & Gantz, supra note 18, at 55.
20.
EU/US: Officials Mull Options over WTO Tax Case, EUR. REP., Jan. 12,
2002, available at 2002 WL 9467180.
21.
Gordon Platt, U.S. Tax Breaks are Still Available, J. OF COM., Oct. 18, 1999,
at 5. Large corporations that utilized FSCs include Boeing, Microsoft, General Motors,
and Caterpillar. Id. Meat companies also used the FSC scheme. Sally Schuff, FSC
Ruling Sets Stage for EU to Flex Muscle at WTO Negotiating Table, FEEDSTUFFS, Aug.
27, 2001, at 1.
22.
Howard Gleckman, Taxing Multinationals: The Donnybrook Ahead, BUS.
Week, Sept. 9, 2002, at 2002 WL 9362904. The Cayman Islands, where no income tax
is paid, is also a popular location for FSCs. Washington Appeals Against WTO FSC
Ruling, supra note 1. The most popular locales are the Virgin Islands, Guam, and
Barbados. Bhala & Gantz, supra note 18, at 54.
23.
Bhala & Gantz, supra note 18, at 54.
24.
Id.
25.
Experts Advise What to Do Now that WTO Has Shot Down FSC
Replacement, supra note 9, at 5.
26.
Paul Nyhan, U.S. Braces for Jolt from WTO, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Aug. 18, 2001, at Fl.
27.
Id.
28.
Soap Cosmetics Chemical Specialties: US-EU Trade Dispute Has Industry
Concerned, CHEM. BUS. NEWSBASE, Sept. 30, 2001; LEXIS, News Library, Chmbus File.
Chemical manufacturers saved $250 million per year from FSCs. Id.
Nyhan, supra note 26.
29.
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the United States as "an internal problem. '30
There is much
speculation, though, that the European Union was merely avenging
its losses in other WTO rulings. 31 In March 2000, the WTO Ruling
Panel ordered that the United States withdraw the FSC subsidies by
33
October 1, 2000.32, The deadline was.extended to November 1, 2000.
On November 15, Congress passed the EIEA. 34 Lawmakers in the
United States described it as "a ringing endorsement in favor of
3' 5
promoting free trade.
The European Union, however, was not as pleased with the
results. In early December 2000, the European Union requested
review of the new legislation, citing a "disagreement as to the
existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken
to comply with the recommendations and rulings" of the WTO Ruling
Panel. 36 The Panel found that the tax scheme was a financial
contribution that conferred a benefit that is based on export
performance as prohibited by Article 3.1(a) of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). 37 Before the WTO
decision on FSCs is analyzed, an overview of the origin and
development of FSCs is necessary.

III. CHANGES IN TRADE TAX LAw-DISCs, FSCs, AND ETI

The taxation scheme on FSCs differs substantially from the
normal U.S. tax system. Usually, U.S. taxpayers are taxed on all
income, regardless of the source. 38 The United States gives taxing

30.
EU Trade Chief Concedes US Faces "Complex Matter" in Changing
Offending Law, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 16, 2002, 2002 WL 2317940. European
Trade Commissioner Lamy has stated that "[t]here is no case for the U.S. to raise their
external protection because they have a competitive problem." Id.
31.
Serious End, GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2002, at 26. European officials vigorously
deny such implications. Leon Brittan of Spennithorne, Letter to the Editor, EU Bound
to Protect Business Interests, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at 16. Still, the relationship
between Lord Brittan and Charlene Barshefsky, the former U.S. trade representative,
was far from cordial (in contrast to the relationship between the current combatants,
Zoellick and Pascal Lamy). Some claim this is one of the reasons the dispute has been
so contentious. Larry Elliott & Charlotte Denny, Strangelove Tendency Revived,
GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2002, at 26.
32.
Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 1.1.
33.
Id.
1.3.
34.
Id.
1.5.
35.
-Richard A. Barsky & Christopher C. Adler, Changes in Tax Law Affect
Global Trade, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 2001, at S14.
36.
Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 1.8.
37.
Id. 9.1.
38.
Brenda O'Leary, Comment: The Continued Viability of Foreign Sales
Corporations (FSCs): An Analysis of the WTO Decision DeclaringFSCs Incompatible

with GATT TradingRules, 2 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 149, 151-52 (2001).
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39
rights to foreign countries from which foreign income is obtained.
From this, a double taxation potentially arises because of different
tax laws in different countries. 40 The FSC provision was designed to
alleviate this problem. 4 1 The FSCs were designed to "promote the
export of their parent U.S. company's products. and, services," but are
actually more like paper companies that "book profits from overseas

sales.,"42

The original law at issue set forth a taxation scheme for domestic
international sales corporations (DISCs) and former DISCs.4 3 This
44
law was meant to encourage U.S. corporations to export their goods.
Essentially, as long as a corporation declared its intent to be a DISC,
it could defer taxes on qualified export income. 45 Half of the profits of
a DISC were taxed as regular income, but no tax was assessed on the
46
other half.
When DISCs became FSCs in 1984, 4 7 the goal was to offset
benefits that European companies received from a similar scheme
within the European Union. 48 Corporations set up the FSCs to
reduce taxes when exporting their goods. 49 Some European nations
do not tax export income, and the United States considers the FSC
law a "remedy for the comparative disadvantage" that U.S. companies
face in the global market. 50 The European Union claims that the
Replacement Law has provided benefits beyond those that were
intended to flow from the legislation, particularly considering that

39.
Id.
Id. The two grounds for taxing income are jurisdiction over the person
40.
(residence principle) or jurisdiction over the activity (territorial system). Id.
41.
Id. (outlining strategies for dealing with double taxation).
42.
EU/ US: WTO Confirms Ruling Against US Tax Havens, EUR. REP., Sept. 1,
2001, available at 2001 WL 26061313.
43.
I.R.C. § 991 (1986).
Anderson, supra note 11 (stating that the scheme was originally intended
44.
to encourage exports).
O'Leary, supra note 38, at 152.
45.
Id.
46.
47.
This action was taken pursuant to the GATT Council Understanding,
adopted in 1981 in response to the GATT stalemate in 1976. The GATT ruled that
DISCs and several European tax regimes challenged by the United States were invalid.
WTO's ExtraterritorialIncome Decision, supra note 2, at 15-16 (statement of Barbara
Angus, International Tax Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury). See also WTO's
ExtraterritorialIncome Decision, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of Peter Davidson)
(providing a history of the DISC-FSC controversy).
Anderson, supra note 11. "We stand to lose tax parity with our trading
48.
partners," said Steve Elkins of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. Id. Indeed,
"most major trading nations have features in their income tax laws that favor exports."
O'Leary, supra note 38, at 149-50.
49.
US Formally Announces WTO Appeal on Export Tax Breaks Ruling,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 15, 2001, 2001 WL 25038169.
50.
WTO Ruling on Export Sales Complicates Trade, Tax Issues, BULLETIN'S
FRONTRUNNER, Feb. 25, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Frntrn File.
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Microsoft and other software makers were permitted to use the
scheme in 1997.51

The new legislation was suspect because it deviated from the
52
usual U.S. system of worldwide taxation with a foreign tax credit.
The FSC could perform all of its activities within the United States,
and no more than fifty percent of the fair market value of the export
"could be attributable to articles imported into the [United States]. '53
In striking down the FSC legislation, the WTO panel noted,
The United States is free to maintain a world wide system, a territorial
tax system or any other system it sees fit .... What it is not free to do
is to establish a regime of direct taxation, provide an exemption from
direct taxes specifically related to exports, and then claim it is entitled
to provide such an export subsidy because it is necessary to eliminate a
54
disadvantage to exporters created by the U.S. tax system itself.

The new legislation, governing taxation of extraterritorial income
(ETI), created new tax breaks that "appl[ied] equally to U.S. exports
and to products the companies manufacture in their overseas
plants. '55 The provisions create a system in which there is "a specific
exclusion from gross income for extraterritorial income," and
companies did not have to actually establish a foreign subsidiary to
partake of the benefit. 56 This legislation, the FSC Replacement Law,
repealed provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that related to
FSCs. 57 No new FSCs could be formed and all inactive FSCs (i.e.,
those that had no foreign trade income for any period of five years)
would cease to be treated as FSCs for tax purposes. 5 8 Additionally,
existing FSCs were given 59
a transitional period to come into
compliance with the new laws.
The WTO found that Section 114 of the EIEA allows certain
taxpayers to be excluded from taxation on certain income, including
extraterritorial income. 60 This includes foreign corporations that1
6
choose to be treated as U.S. corporations for tax purposes.
Extraterritorial income is the gross income of a company that is
derived from foreign trading receipts involving the sale or lease of

51.
Anderson, supra note 11.
52.
McDaniel, supranote 13, at 1629.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 1632 (quoting World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United
States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108R,
7.122, (Oct.
8, 1999)).
55.
Deal with EU Gives U.S. Time to Rewrite Law on Tax Breaks; Americans'
Offshore Investments at Issue, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2000, at C20.
56.
Barsky & Adler, supra note 35.
57.
Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 2.1.
58.
FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-519, 114 Stat. 2433(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
59.
114 Stat. 2433(c) (2000).
60.
Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 2.3.
61.
Id. 2.3 n.22.
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"qualifying foreign trade property" not for use in the United States. 62
Qualifying income is, within a given transaction, the greater of 30% of
foreign sale and leasing income, 63 1.2% of the foreign trading gross
receipts, 6 4 or 15% of the foreign trade income of the taxpayer from the
transaction. 65 Foreign trade income is income that is attributable to
66
foreign trading receipts of the taxpayer.
For the Replacement Law to apply to a corporation, at least half
of its foreign trading gross receipts had to come from the sale or
exchange of qualified foreign trade property. 67 Property that is in
"short supply" is not excluded; 68 nor is property leased to a relative or
a patent or invention. 6 9 Qualifying property, to be eligible for the
taxing system, had to be produced by a domestic corporation, an
individual citizen of the United States, a foreign corporation that has
elected to be subject to U.S. tax laws, or a partnership composed of
those described in the other three groups. 70 Businesses that chose to
create FSCs received a thirty percent tax rebate on their export
income.

71

The European Union, in challenging the law, claimed that the
exclusion of extraterritorial income from taxation resulted in a
"financial contribution" in the form of "government revenue that was
otherwise due."72 Given that there was no general provision in the
tax code excluding such income, other income that could be
73
characterized as extraterritorial was subject to normal taxation.
The United States urged that the new law did not provide a financial

62.
Id.
2.4. "Qualifying foreign trade property" includes property that is
manufactured in the United States, but held for sale outside of the United States. The
property must not have more than 50% of its value attributable to articles
manufactured outside the United States or direct cost for labor performed outside of
the United States. I.R.C. § 943(a)(1) (2000).
63.
I.R.C. § 941(a)(1)(A). Foreign sale and leasing income includes income
allocable to foreign economic processes performed outside the United States that are
procured from the lease of property outside the United States. I.R.C. § 941(c)(1); see
also Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 2.5.
64.
I.R.C. § 941(a)(1)(B). Foreign trading gross receipts are generated by sale
or lease of property not for use domestically. Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 2.6(B).
65.
I.R.C. § 941(a)(1)(C). Companies could choose which benefit they wanted,
but ascertaining which provision would maximize the benefit required "extensive
calculations." Barsky & Adler, supranote 35.
66.
I.R.C. § 941(b)(1).
67.
I.R.C. § 942(a)(1)(E); see also I.R.C. § 942(a)(1)(A) (clarifying the
requirements of the Replacement Law).
68.
Tax Treatment 1, supra note 1,
2.6. Property in "short supply" includes
items such as oil and unprocessed timber. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 943(a)(4).
69.
I.R.C. § 943(a)(3).
70.
I.R.C. § 943(a)(2).
71.
Faisal Islam, EU Told Trade War Would Sink Global Recovery, OBSERVER,
Aug. 26, 2001, at 2.
72.
Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 8.4.
73.
Id.
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contribution, but that extraterritorial income simply was not taxable
at all without the EIEA. 74 The WTO reported its findings on the
75
FSC-ETI laws on August 20, 2001.

IV. THE WTO

DECISIONS

A. Tax Treatment I (August 2001)
The European Union claimed that the FSC Replacement Law
was flawed because it granted export subsidies within the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and the
Agreement of Agriculture (AA)-subsidies that were contingent upon
export performance.7 6 The European Union also said that the United
States failed to remove the subsidy after the deadline and had not
complied with its obligations to the WTO.77 The United States
countered that the exclusion of extraterritorial income did not give
78
less favorable treatment to imports as compared to domestic goods.
The WTO, in analyzing whether a subsidy existed, looked to
whether there was a financial contribution by the government that
constituted uncollected government revenue.7 9 The threshold
question was whether the Replacement Law itself foregoes collecting
80
the revenue to which the government has given up its entitlement.
In this analysis, the WTO Ruling Panel used a "but for" test to
answer the question. 81 In doing so, it noted that certain income is
excluded from taxation, and that income must "satisfy stringently
82
selective qualitative conditions and quantitative requirements."
The Panel found that this was an "effective departure" from the
general principles of the tax regime. 83 The income would normally be
taxed, but, because of the FSC Replacement Law, it was not being
taxed.84 From this exclusion of portions of gross income, the Panel
decided that the initial question of whether the Replacement Law
85
foregoes collecting the revenue should be answered affirmatively.
The Panel characterized the "qualifying foreign trade" and similar

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. 8.6.
Id.
Id. 3.1.
Id.
Id. 3.3.
Id. 8.8.
Id. 77 8.13, 8.16.

81.

Id. 7 8.11.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. 7 8.21.
Id. 7 8.25.
Id.
Id. 8.26.
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exceptions as "carve-outs" of the prevailing tax system, noting that
these characteristics made the Replacement Law suspect. 86 The
Panel ultimately determined that the FSC Replacement Law did
provide a financial contribution within the meaning of the SCM
87
Agreement.
The United States maintained that the purpose of the exclusion
clause of the legislation was "to treat all foreign transactions alike
regardless of where goods are manufactured. 8 8s The European Union
countered that, while foreign income could be excluded from taxation
within the dictates of WTO agreements, extraterritorial income was
not foreign income. 89 The WTO ultimately rejected the U.S.
argument, stating that just because the United States included
language indicating that extraterritorial income was a category that
could be excluded from taxation did not mean that ETI was such an
excludable category. 90
In analyzing the FSC Replacement Law through this lens, the
Panel first noted that the provision was "inconclusive on its face" as
to the question of whether revenue existed that was "otherwise
due." 9 1 Functionally, however, the Panel found the legislation much
less benign.
Taken to its logical extreme, this U.S. argument would be that a
government could opt to bestow financial contributions in the form of
fiscal incentives simply by modulating the "outer boundary" of its "tax
jurisdiction" or by manipulating the definition of the tax base to
accommodate any "exclusion" ... it desired, so that there could never be
a foregoing of revenue "otherwise due." This would have the effect of
reducing [the subsidy clause] of the SCM Agreement to "redundancy
and inutility and cannot be the appropriate implication to draw from
the stipulation as to what constitutes one of the enumerated forms of
92
'financial contribution."'

There was much discussion of footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement,
which stated that the Agreement is "not intended to limit a Member
from taking measures to avoid the double-taxation of foreign-source
income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another
Member." 93 The United States urged that this sentence meant there
94
was no limit on how members provided relief from double taxation.
The European Union questioned whether the intent was truly to

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. 8.28.
Id. 7 8.30.
Id. 8.33.
Id. 8.33.
Id. 8.36 (emphasis added).
Id. IT 8.37, 8.38.
Id. 8.39 (emphasis in original).
Id. 8.72 (quoting the SCM Agreement).
Id. 7 8.82.
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5
allow members to avoid double taxation completely. 9 Further, the
European Union claimed the U.S. system did not achieve the goal of
avoiding double taxation, since some businesses still needed foreign
tax credits to avoid the problem. 96 The Panel concluded that the
Replacement Law was not designed to avoid double taxation and
therefore was not defensible under footnote 59 of the SCM
97
Agreement.
The FSC Replacement Law was classified as "even worse" than
the original law. 98 The European Union called upon the United
States to make "wholesale changes" to the legislation in order to
comply with the WTO's standards. 99 In October 2001, U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick announced that the United States
would seek an appeal of the decision. 10 0 However, from the outset it
was clear that the prospects that the WTO would reverse the decision
were slim.' 10 The United States urged that the ruling violated the
WTO principle that members should not be forced into choosing "a
particular kind of tax system."'10 2 However, as expected, the WTO
Panel affirmed the initial decision on January 14, 2002.103

B.

Tax Treatment II (January2002)

The WTO's decision on appeal was more narrow than its original
The Appellate Body re-examined the issues of (1)
decision.' 0 4

Id. 8.86.
95.
Id. 8.89.
96.
Id. 8.97.
97.
US Tax Break is Illegal, ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 30, 2001, at 17.
98.
Id.
99.
Trade Representative to Appeal WTO Ruling against US Tax Policy, supra
100.
note 9.
See Experts Advise What to Do Now that WTO Has Shot Down FSC
101.
Replacement Act, supra note 9. See also Ian Elliott, U.N. to Pump $200 Million into
Afghanistan for Agricultural Aid, FEEDSTUFFS, Nov. '19, 2001, at 2 (citing recent
studies indicating that "in almost 75% of the cases brought under WTO's dispute
settlement process, the complaining country... subsequently wins"); Michael Mann, US
Call for Clear Rules on Taxation, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at 14 (stating that the
decision ruling was "so overwhelming that few expect" it to be overturned on appeal).
William New, Taxes: U.S. Presents Appeal on WTO Tax Case, NAT'L J.'s
102.
TECH. DAILY, Nov. 27, 2001 available at www.nationaljournal.comlpubs/ techdaily
(quoting Assistant Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam). "Few things are as central to a
country's sovereignty as how it raises revenue .... It is not the role of the WTO to
substitute its judgment for the judgment of a member's own lawmakers in this regard."
Id.
WTO Rules Against US in Tax Break Dispute with EU, AGENCE FRANCE
103.
PRESSE, Jan. 14, 2002, 2002 WL 2316480. The decision authorized an offset of the
subsidy, gained by increasing tariffs on U.S. goods. Robert Branand, Three Trade
Issues Mean 'Boom or Bust, 'MODERN PLASTICS, Mar. 1, 2002, at 52.
104.
William New, Taxes: WTO Panel Delivers Final Blow to U.S. Tax Break,
NAT'L J.'s TECH. DAILY, Jan. 14, 2002, available at www.nationaljournal.com
pubs/techdaily.
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whether the FSC-ETI statutes involved "a "foregoing of revenue ...
'otherwise due"' that provided a "financial contribution,"110 5 (2)
whether the alleged subsidy was "contingent . . . upon export

performance,"' 1 6 and (3) SCM Agreement footnote 59 double tax
l0 7
avoidance.
While upholding, the bulk of the Panel's decision, the Appellate
Body found some error in the original analysis. First, the appellate
decision noted that the Panel erred in characterizing the prevailing
U.S. tax system as one in which gross income is taxed, noting that
taxpayers can make deductions when calculating income tax. 0 8 The
Appellate Body compared how the United States taxes income
covered by the FSC Replacement Law, with the way it taxes other
foreign source income. 10 9 The Appellate Body found that most foreign
source income is taxable subject to deductions 1" and a tax credit for
"taxes deemed to have been paid by that taxpayer" to another
jurisdiction.1 1 ' The Appellate Body found that, based on the fact that
a business chooses to be treated under the FSC statute, the
Replacement Law was a departure from the general taxation scheme
the Law impermissible despite the Panel's procedural
and deemed
112
error.
The Appellate Body's decision regarding footnote 59 of the SCM
Agreement was a major blow, finding that the footnote was not an
"exception to the general definition of. subsidy."!l 3 Further, the
Appellate Body stated that the U.S. statute did not fall within the
114
meaning of footnote 59 and could not be salvaged in that respect.
The minor narrowing of the decision was cold comfort for those
hoping the U.S. arguments regarding the FSC legislation would be
vindicated on appeal. Therefore, change and compliance are now the
key issues in the FSC saga. President Bush has pledged to comply
with the WTO ruling and has promised an overhaul of the tax laws to

105.
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United StatesTax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002),
80, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu.e/dispue.htm [hereinafter
Tax Treatment II].
106.
Id. (ellipses in original).
Id.
107.
See id. 84. The Appellate Body instead characterized the U.S. system as
108.
one that "seeks to allocate income between domestic- and foreign-source income." Id.
97.
109.

110.
Mii.
112.
"otherwise
113.
114.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
due"
Id.
Id.

98.

99.
100.
103. This was also seen as a confirmation of the finding that revenue
104.
was foregone by the government. Id.
129.
186.

20021

A VOIDINGA NUCLEAR TRADE WAR

1363

do SO. 1 15 Still, the battle over the specific implications of the decision
is far from over, as the United States and European Union are still
squabbling over various aspects of what the WTO's decision will
require of the United States.
C. Aftermath of the Decisions

Since the WTO's decision, most of the discussion on FSCs has
focused on how much will be paid and what will be done to cure the
problem with the law. 116 While strategies for change are discussed
more fully later in this Note, the argument over the amount of
sanctions merits mention. The WTO originally claimed that the tax
subsidy was worth four billion dollars in sanctions and authorized
the
17
imposition of this penalty against various U.S. industries.
The United States suggested the sanctions should be less than
one-fourth of what the European Union requested. 118 The United
States based its number on the theory that the European Union is
entitled to impose sanctions only in the amount of "actual trade losses
suffered due to the U.S. subsidy." 119 Put another way, the United
States argued that the European Union can only impose sanctions for
sales lost as a "direct result" of the FSC break. 120 The U.S. model for
sanctions was more in keeping with the WTO's "traditional
methodology" in calculating sanctions. 121
However, the WTO
ultimately accepted the EU's four-billion-dollar proposal. 122 The
sanctions imposed will be the largest retaliation ever authorized by
the WTO.

123

115.
Edward Alden, Brussels Hails Bush Tax Reform Pledge, FIN. TIMES, May 3,
2002, at 2. President Bush acknowledges, however, that he will need the hell) of the
legislature to meet the demands of the European Union. See Keith Koffler, Europeans
Not DroppingRetaliatory Threats over Steel Tariffs, NAT'L J.'S CONGRESSDAILY, May 3,
2002, available at www.nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily.
116.
See infra Part VI; see e.g., Alden, supra note 3.
117.
See, e.g., America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 2.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.

Id.

121.
122.
123.

Id.
See Williams, supra note 6.
Id.
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V. "A NUCLEAR BOMB"1 24 -IMPACT ON TRADE
The WTO's decision has the potential for spurring a transAtlantic trade war between the United States and Europe. 125 In fact,
former U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart Eizenstadt, one of the
drafters of the FSC Replacement Law, says that the sanctions "could
bring the [European Union] and the [United States] to their biggest
126
ever trade war" that could destroy a global economic recovery.
The United States maintains that the challenge was merely a
ploy by the European Union to "gain clout" in WTO agricultural
negotiations. 127 At the time of the decision, about half of all U.S.
exports were made through FSCs. 128
The United States has
characterized the imposition of sanctions as a "nuclear option"; that
is, one that will completely obliterate the trade relationship between
the two entities.129
The European Union has said that if sanctions are imposed, it
130
may not choose to seek the full entitlement of four billion dollars.
The European Union has also indicated that it would prefer not to
exercise the sanctions option but would prefer that the United States

124.
Warren Giles and Blair Pethel, EU Says WTO Rejects U.S. Tax Law,
Permitting Sanctions Claim, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 14, 2002, LEXIS, News Library
Allbbn File (reporting Trade Representative Robert Zoellick's comment on the effects of
sanctions on foreign trade). But see Carter Dougherty, WTO Nullifies U.S. Tax Break
in Trade Dispute with EU, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A3 (quoting Robert Litan, a
trade scholar at the Brookings Institute, who dismissed this notion: "It's not the start
of a nuclear war... It is one of a zillion problems that make life difficult."). The vast
consensus, however, is that the results of retaliation could be quite dire. See Edward
Alden et al., Ruling Opens New Chapterin US-EU Trade Dispute, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2002, at 10.

125.
126.

See America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 2.
EU/US: WTO Confirms Ruling Against US Tax Havens, supranote 42.

127.
Schuff, supra note 22. "The EU has alleged little actual harm to European
producers" in its complaint to the WTO. Van Oudenaren, supra note 14.

128.
Exporters' Tax Break Ruled Illegal; The World Trade Organization Upheld
its Ruling that U.S. Business Gets an Unfair Advantage, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 24,
2000, at B5. Affected industries include machinery, chemicals, transportation, and
agriculture. Id.
129.
See America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 2. The European Union
has made a preliminary list of industries it will target-industries where the European
Union has found that the products could be subject to sanctions without detrimental
effects on EU consumers and industry. EU/US: WTO Confirms Ruling Against US
Tax Havens, supra note 42. Targeted goods include live animals, books, iron and steel
machinery, cereals, aircraft, and toiletries and cosmetics. See America's Taxing Trade

Troubles, supra note 2; see also Soap Cosmetics Chemical Specialties: US-EU Trade
Dispute Has Industry Concerned, supra note 28 (both listing products on which the
European Union plans to increase tariffs).

130.

America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 2.
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simply end the FSC scheme altogether. 131 Some suggest, however,
that the European Union would be unwise to force the issue, given its
"large trade surpluses with the United States, its own failure to
comply with WTO rulings, and the spotty record it brings to market
enforcement within the Union."'132 Despite this, the European Union
will turn to "more formal dispute settlement procedures" if
"insufficient flexibility is shown" on the FSC issue. 133 At this stage,
the United States must begin to consider ways to change the current
trade tax system to avoid the catastrophic impact that EU retaliation
would have on its trading regime.

VI.

AVOIDING SANCTIONS-STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

Corporate taxation of export income "is an area that is really ripe
for reform. '134
Unfortunately, the FSC decision comes at a
particularly difficult time, when the economic downturn has reached
global proportions, 135 the United States is at war, and major
companies are suffering serious financial problems. It is true that the
United States is not required by international pacts to change its tax
laws in response to the WTO decision. 136
Some groups have
advocated non-compliance with the WTO decisions regarding
FSCs. 137 Indeed, corporate tax consultants say that until there is a
new statute in force, corporations have "no choice but to go on
accepting the FSC Replacement Act . . . until and unless it is
8
replaced."13

131.
Id. See also Managing Exports Miscellany, MANAGING EXPORTS, Dec. 2001,
at 8 (reporting that the European Union would rather negotiate a settlement than
impose sanctions on the United States).
132.
Van Oudenaren, supra note 14. See also Blair Pethel, Senate Fast-Track
Bill Puts U.S.-EU Tax Row into New WTO Round, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 12, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File (quoting Deputy Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam
as stating that the affirmance of the WTO decision "would place the tax provisions.. .of
many other countries at risk").
133.
Press Release, European Union, EU Issues Annual Report on US Trade
Barriers (Oct. 8, 2001), 2001 WL 28792126.
134.
Edward Alden, White House Backs Repeal of Exporters' Tax Break, FIN.
TIMES, June 14, 2002, at 9 (quoting Glenn Hubbard, Chair of the White House Council
of Economic Advisers).
135.
America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 2.
136.
Ben Stone, WTO Rules Against U.S. Export Tax Law, NAT'L DEFENSE, Oct.
2001, at 43.
137.
See Platt, supra note 21. Robert Thornton characterized shutting down
FSCs as a mistake, and noted that corporations should "go ahead and get [their] tax
benefit." Id. This was, however, written before the repeal of the Replacement Law.
See id.
138.
Experts Advise What to Do Now that WTO Has Shot Down FSC
Replacement Act, supra note 9.
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However, by refusing to comply with the decision, selected
industries will be subject to massive trade sanctions that they will be
loath to accept.1 3 9
Even so, the benefit cannot be completely
abandoned by merely repealing the EIEA. Doing so will significantly
disadvantage U.S. businesses vis-A-vis their foreign counterparts
because of their taxation systems. 140 For example, the French valueadded-tax (VAT) is twenty-five percent of the retail price of a good,
but it is waived on goods that leave the country. 14 1 However, similar
taxes imposed by the U.S. government are not refunded upon the
export of those goods. 14 2 The United States accepted this system
when Europe was rebuilding following World War II, but it can no
longer afford to do so in the current economy without taking some
measures to ensure its own economic stability and trading
competitiveness. 143
Some suggest that if the United States does not comply with the
WTO decision, the European Union will impose tariffs unilaterally as
a retaliatory measure. 144 The United States also risks "rack[ing] up
WTO-sanctioned duties on U.S. exports" should it choose to ignore the
WTO ruling. 145 It would be very difficult for the European Union to
find four billion dollars worth of goods to block "without doing serious
damage" to itself.146 Still, the United States uses the export subsidy
"stick" against other countries more than any other nation. 147 It is
imperative that the United States avoid setting a bad example and
encouraging other nations to use similar tactics of non-compliance

139.
Stone, supra note 136.
140.
Impact of Financialand Professional Service Exports on Small Business:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Small Business, 107th Cong. 116 (2001) (statement of
David L. Aaron, Senior International Adviser, Dorsey & Whitney). International trade
rules "bar the refund of income taxes but encourage the refund of excise taxes." Id.
This is particularly disadvantageous to U.S. businesses as compared to European
competitors because the United States derives its revenue from income tax, whereas
European nations acquire their revenue from excise taxes (specifically, the value added
tax, or VAT). Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
See id.
144.
Anderson, supra note 11.
145.
A Subsidy by Any Other Name, supranote 12.

146.

Impact of Financialand Professional Service Exports on Small Business:

HearingBefore the Comm. on Small Business, supra note 140. The trade relationship
between the United States and the European Union is worth about $1.9 trillion per

year. Brian Knowlton, U.S. and EU in Accord on Future of Mideast; Trade Disputes
Remain at Summit Talks, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 3, 2002, at 1. "'Pascal Lamy... is
like the dog who caught the bus' . . . the EU might end up worse off as a result of a
WTO ruling [on the FSC issue] it so badly sought." Edward Alden, Congress Looks at
Tax Advantages of Foreign Companies, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 2002, at 3 (quoting Rep.
Sander Levin).

147.

Impact of Financialand Professional Service Exports on Small Business:

HearingBefore the Comm. on Small Business, supra note 140.
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against the United States. 148 Such a situation could have a severe
economic and non-economic impact on U.S. businesses, both on their
international reputations and on lost revenues from foreign
149
subsidization of other nations' industries.
The WTO suggests "reforming the very basis of the U.S. tax
system."150 Despite this call to action, some in the United States still
suggest that the tax code be revamped again, not in the vision of the
151
WTO, but to retain the tax benefit granted by the FSC laws.
Another option that has been suggested is a territorial tax system
that would not tax companies' foreign business operations and would
be even more beneficial to exports. 152 Still others urge a negotiated
153
settlement.
15 4
Some action must be taken to ensure competitiveness.
However, U.S. officials believe that the WTO's instructions are
unclear and riddled with new and vague rules. 155 Deputy Treasury
Secretary Kenneth Dam opines, "the only way to maintain parity
with the tax systems of other countries could be through
comprehensive reform by scrapping our entire tax system and
starting over. '156 Hopefully, the solution will not have to be so rash.
Senate Finance Chairman Max Baucus believes that "legislative
action might not even be possible, '15 7 and that solving the tax spat

See id.
148.
See id.
149.
150.
'Islam, supra note 71.
Schuff, supra note 21. Chuck Grassley (R-IA), the ranking Republican on
151.
the Senate Finance Committee, suggested. that the appeal would buy time that
Congress needed to accomplish this task. Id. He says the United States should "play
the same game the EU plays..'.using every stall available." Id. 'See also A Subsidy by
Any Other Name, supra note 12 ("Rather than complain, the U.S. government could use
the ruling to its own advantage to improve its tax code and to battle against
widespread European subsidies.").
152.
Platt, supra note 21.
153.
Anderson, supra note 11. Senator William Roth (R-DE) and Congressman
Bill Archer (R-TX) said that if the conflict were not solved bilaterally, it would be
"likely to lead to a highly charged tax and trade environment that we are sure all
parties would like to avoid." Id.
154.
See Impact of Financial and Professional Service Exports on Small
Business: Hearing Before the Comm. on Small Business, supra note 140 (commenting
that U.S. exports will be "sorely disadvantaged" if the law is simply repealed).
155.
New, supra note 102 (quoting Assistant Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam).
156.
Deputy Treasury Secretary Argues WTO Case on FSCs, NAT'L J.'S
CONGRESSDAILY, Nov. 28, 2001, available at www.nationaljournal.com/pubs/
congressdaily.
157.
Thomas Says Remedy For Foreign Sales Corporations Could Take Over,
NAT'L J.'S CONGRESS Daily, Feb. 7, 2002, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/
pubs/congressdaily. However, Baucus has promised to hold hearings this year on
international taxation in the Senate Finance Committee. Alden, supra note 134.
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could take years. 158 Whatever the outcome, "no solution will be ideal
for the United States.' 5 9
If a new tax is the answer, however, the new scheme should give
answers to the following six questions: what is the tax base, what are
the rates, 160 who will pay the tax,161 when will the tax be paid, how
should the tax be applied to cross-border transactions, 162 and how
should the tax be administered. 63 Professor Paul R. McDaniel
suggests that the tax scheme should be generally applicable and must
not deviate for "specified classes of taxpayers or activity."'1 64 For
Professor McDaniel, the key inquiry at this juncture is "who will pay
the tax. ' 16 5 The WTO has answered that all corporations, regardless
of where they operate or what percentage of their goods are exported,
166
must pay the same tax rate.

The WTO arbitration procedure will be reactivated now that the
appeal has been decided, 167 but the United States needs a back-up
plan in the event that negotiations fail. While Trade Representative
Zoellick is hopeful about the prospects of negotiation, 168 given the
nature of the problem there must be another solution that the United

158.
EU/US: Key US Senator Warns over Tax Deal for FSC Dispute, EUR. REP.,
Feb. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13764231. Indeed, Senator Baucus believes that
Congress will not pass a new tax this year. U.S. Says Correct FSC Trade Sanctions
Less than $1 Billion, NAT'L J.'S CONGRESSDAILY, Feb. 15, 2002, available at
www.nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily.
159.
Candace Carmichael, Note, Foreign Sales Corporations-Subsidies,
Sanctions, and Trade Wars, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 209 (2002). This is true
both in terms of effect on export commerce and in terms of preservation of national
sovereignty. See id.; see also Evelyn Iritani, WTO Disallows U.S. Tax Breaks, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at Cl.
160.
Some examples of tax rates are progressive, proportional, and regressive.
McDaniel, supra note 13, at 1623.
161.
For example, the government must decide whether to treat shareholders
and corporations as separate taxpayers or to integrate their taxes. Id. This is difficult
because the corporations that have previously benefited from the FSC provisions are
eager to preserve their benefits, but their only common characteristic is that they all
export. Carter Dougherty, Export Subsidy Eyed; Congress to Tackle WTO Tax Irritant,
WASH. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at C9. A tax based solely on whether the company exports
goods will not comply with the WTO ruling. See id.; see also infra Part IV.A.
162.
McDaniel, supra note 13, at 1624. Three possibilities for dealing with
export are worldwide taxation of income with a credit for foreign tax paid, exemption of
foreign income, or worldwide taxation with a deduction for foreign tax paid. Id.
163.
Id. at 1622 (listing the questions to be answered). The rules should be
uniform for all taxpayers. Id. at 1624.
164.
Id. at 1623.
165.
See id.
166.
See Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 8.33.
167.
WTO Rules in Favor of EU in US Export Subsidy Case, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Jan. 14, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
168.
See Zoellick, Rockefeller Butt Heads over Trade Negotiations, NAT'L J.'S
CONGRESSDAILY,
Feb. 6, 2002, available at www.nationaljournal.com/pubs/
congressdaily.
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States can use if the two parties fail to reach a mutually agreeable
solution. The alternatives to writing a new tax code involve tinkering
with the current tax system. The remainder of this discussion will
explore such propositions centered on changes to the current tax
system.
A. A Change in Direction-The TerritorialTax Planand ValueAdded Tax (VAT)
The most-frequently mentioned option is to create a territorial
system of taxation, akin to that used in Europe. 169 Under a
be
territorial plan, only income earned inside the United States would 170
taxed, though some selected foreign income could also be taxed.
Supporters of such a plan cite many benefits. First and foremost, it
would comply with the WTO ruling.' 7 ' Indeed, Daniel Mitchell
advocates 'junk[ing] our worldwide corporate tax system and
switch[ing] to a territorial tax system. If [the United States] goes to a
territorial system', it will be 'completely WTO compliant."' 17 2 Under
the SCM Agreement, VAT and similar sales taxes were not
considered to be subsidies within the meaning of the Agreement. 17 3
This is because VAT is an indirect tax that is placed on a good rather
than directed at a person. 174 Such an endorsement by the SCM
Agreement ensures that if this line of action were pursued, the
United States would be in compliance with WTO requirements.
Additionally, proponents argue that a territorial tax will make
U.S. companies more competitive by eliminating taxation by the U.S.
government when the company is in a jurisdiction with a low tax

Experts Advise What to Do Now that WTO Has Shot Down FSC
169.
Replacement Act, supranote 9.
Warren Giles and Blair Pethel, WTO Rejects U.S. Tax Law, Setting Stage
170.
for EU Punitive Tariffs, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 14, 2002, LEXIS, News Library,

Allbbn File.
See Daniel Mitchell, Europe's Tax Hit on America, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 24,
171.
2002, at A16 (noting that most U.S. trading partners have a territorial taxation
system).
172.

Trade Analyst

Warns Administration is

on

Wrong Track with FSC

Negotiations, WHITE HOUSE BULLETIN, Mar. 11, 2002, available at http://www.pff.orgl
press/ecommerceWHB032702_filesfWHO20327.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
Bhala & Gantz, supra note 18, at 54. This decision is seen as a "disparity
173.
in treatment" by some commentators, who claim that there is no difference in economic
effect between the VAT and the FSC. Ongoing Trade Negotiation: HearingBefore the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://finance.senate.gov
(statement of George Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association).
Sarah Ostergaard, Note, The Third Strike: United States' Attempts at
174.
Achieving Tax ParityBetween Its Income Tax and the European Value-Added Tax, 27 J.
LEGIS. 421, 424 (2001).
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rate. 175 Reduced compliance costs are also another benefit-simpler
rules (i.e., rules that do not have a complicated tax credit system)
would reduce paperwork and the chance of error 'in attempting to
apply the "myriad rules and restrictions." 176 Finally, by eliminating
the current system, supporters of the territorial system urge that
177
companies will stop fleeing to lower tax jurisdictions.
In an exemption system, an exemption would apply to the
"branch profits of any U.S. corporation and to dividends received by
U.S. corporate taxpayers from foreign corporations. ' 17 8 For example,
income from royalties and interest are not taxable in foreign
1 79
jurisdictions and would not be exempt under the new U.S. law.
Passive income-income that has no "nexus to business activity"would not be eligible for exemption. 180 Proponents of this plan argue
that there should still be foreign tax credits to avoid double
taxation. 181 Generally, income would be divided into two categories1 82
income that is already taxed, and income that is exempt.
Eliminating the deferral system under the DISC law and its progeny
would simplify and streamline the compliance process for
183
corporations, reducing costs for those corporations.
To ease transition, the U.S. government could forgive tax on
income that would be exempt under the new law earned in the time

175.
Mitchell, supra note 171. Mitchell suggests that the framers of the FSC
legislation understood that "worldwide taxation harms America's export-oriented
companies." Id.
176.
See id. One study suggests that about 40% of "tax compliance costs is
attributable to the taxation of foreign source income, even though foreign operations
account for only about 20% of these companies' economic activity." Michael J. Graetz &
Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for Foreign Income of U.S.
Corporations,54 NAT'L TAX J. 771, 772 (Dec. 1, 2001).
177.
Mitchell, supra note 171. Mitchell claims that the worldwide tax system
caused Accenture, Ingersoll-Rand, Tyco and Fruit of the Loom to move their
headquarters to foreign countries. Id. Mitchell claims "the only reason" the firms go to
lower tax jurisdictions is "to get out from our worldwide corporate tax system" and
preserve their offshore revenues. Trade Analyst Warns Administration is on Wrong
Track with FSC Negotiations, supra note 172. See also WTO Export Subsidy Decision:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002), at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/fullcomm/lO7cong/2-27-02/2-27rams.htm (statement of
Congressman Jim Ramstad).
178.
Graetz and Oosterhuis, supra note 176, at 774.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 775. This policy, it is argued, would reduce the incentive for
companies to move such assets offshore. Id.
181.
Id. To come within SCM Agreement footnote 59, the United States must be
able to show that the scheme was implemented to avoid double taxation. See Tax
Treatment II, supra note 105, 186.
182.
Graetz and Oosterhuis, supra note 176, at 777-82.
183.
Id. at 777; see also Mitchell, supra note 171.
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before the new law went into effect.1 8 4 Alternatively, the government
could levy a toll on investments in foreign corporations as a condition
for exemptions.' 8 5 Finally, Congress could provide for a transition
system that would make dividends from pre-exemption earnings
18 6
eligible for tax credit.
One permutation of the tax code modification plan is to create a
VAT in the United States.18 7 A U.S. VAT would require a massive rewrite of the tax code, something Congress would likely be unwilling to
undertake.1 8 8 The VAT is a tax on the consumption of goods.18 9 This
tax does not apply to income earned on exports. 190 To implement a
VAT, the U.S. tax system would have to change substantially. 19 1 The
FSC Replacement Law is seen as a mimicking of a VAT. 192 The
problem is that while the European version is an indirect tax from
which a government may exclude a portion from liability, the U.S.
income tax is a direct tax from which the government cannot exclude
a portion from liability. 19 3 Therefore, the United States would have
to change its corporate tax structure to an indirect system to fully
comply. 194 Such an overhaul is not a task that Congress would want
to take up at this juncture, particularly with other pressing issues,
such as the war against terrorism and a midterm election, on the
minds of its members.
Critics of the exemption system, who advocate adhering to the
worldwide taxation system, cite the uncertainty of benefits of
simplification in an exemption system and the reduced
competitiveness of U.S. businesses abroad if the United States
forsakes its current system. 195 Further, "if the WTO is able to place
such pressure on the United States, it suggests serious limitations on
the ability of the United States to shape the international

Graetz and Oosterhuis, supra note 176, at 783-84. This option is unlikely
184.
to be adopted. Id. at 784.
Id. at 784.
185.
Id.
186.
187.
Impact of Financial and Professional Service Exjiorts on Small Business:
HearingBefore the Comm. on Small Business, supra note 140.
188.
Id.
Ostergaard, supra note 174, at 421. Europe's VAT is set at 20%. Bhala &
189.
Gantz, supranote 18, at 53.
190.
Ostergaard, supra note 174, at 421. U.S. exports, similarly, are not subject
to state sales taxes, but state sales taxes are much lower than the VAT. Bhala &
Gantz, supra note 18, at 54.
See Ostergaard, supra note 174, at 438.
191.
192.
Id.
See id.
193.
Id. at 439.
194.
195.
See J. Clifton Fleming et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The
Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 352 (2001)
(citing fairness as a standard for taxation of income, and arguing that the current U.S.
taxation system best fits that model).
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environment. 1 96 At a time when the United States must show all the
strength it can muster, it cannot afford to give the impression that it
will bend to the will of other entities and allow its taxation scheme to
be dictated by the WTO. 197 The United States risks such a perception
in adopting a tax plan more like that of the European Union.
In terms of Professor McDaniel's model and the WTO mandate,
the VAT would have to apply to all industries, not only those
industries with large export divisions. 198 This could cause problems
for goods sold domestically since the VAT would have to be paid on
goods that are sold in the United States, raising prices on domestic
goods and making them less competitive in this country. 199 In this
way, a VAT in the United States could create a unique competitive

disadvantage

for U.S.

goods

sold domestically,

giving foreign

businesses a new advantage in the U.S. market. For this reason, the
VAT seems particularly unattractive as a solution to the current tax

problem.
While some lawmakers favor
such a drastic change is unlikely
legislature, especially because the
attack on the tax system as an

20 0
a broad program of fiscal reform,
to capture majority support in the
United States justifiably views this
20 1
attack on national sovereignty.

196.
Carmichael, supra note 159, at 207.
197.
See WTO's Extraterritorial Income Decision: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 46 (2002) (testimony of Gary Hufbauer,
Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics). "I believe in the virtues of
uniform taxation. But I don't believe these virtues should be imposed from Geneva."
Id. (quoting Hufbauer).
198.
See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
199.
See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
200.
The Treasury Department is eager to undergo full-scale tax reform, stating
that the current U.S. international corporate taxation system is "at least 30 years
outdated." Edward Alden, WTO Ruling 'Will Require US Corporate Tax Reform,' FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at 7. Congressman Bill Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, also sees an opportunity to reform the tax structure while
meeting international obligations. WTO's ExtraterritorialIncome Decision: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of
Congressman Thomas).
It is in our interest that others follow the rules and therefore it is imperative
that we follow the rules as well. To that end, we must carefully and thoroughly
address the problems created at the intersection of our tax code and our
international trade obligations ....
This decision marks the fourth time that
the WTO has ruled this way, twice in the [FSC] case and now twice in the [ETI]
case.
Id. (quoting Congressman Thomas).
201.
See Guy de Jonquieres, Raising the TransatlanticTrade Stakes, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2002, at 17. See also Iritani, supra note 159 (quoting Max Baucus, Chair of
the Senate Finance Committee). The United States should not give in to European
pressure to change the tax system and should see that the WTO "preserve the
sovereign right of each country to set its own tax policy." Id. See also Dangerous
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These arguments, however, will not release the United States from
its obligations. Though a plan must be formulated, full-scale tax
reform probably will not come quickly enough to satisfy EU
complaintants, even given its purported desire to avoid retaliation,
because of the complicated nature of such a fundamental change in
tax law. 20 2 Indeed, even proponents of the plan acknowledge that
'20 3
Currently, no
such change could take "at least another year.
branch of government seems particularly willing to come up with any
legislative solution; 20 4 therefore, passing one of this magnitude would
be quite remarkable. 20 5 Though the territorial tax plan would
unquestionably comply with the WTO decisions, the answer to the
U.S. tax woes appears to lie elsewhere.
B. A Variation of the EuropeanModel-Rebate of Excise Taxes
Another option rebates existing excise taxes in a manner similar
20 6
U.S. Representative
to the way European nations rebate the VATs.

Activities-Trade Disputes, ECONOMIST, May 5, 2002, at 92 ("Many lawmakers are
already furious at the notion that the WTO has any role in domestic tax changes.
Their willingness to comply in an atmosphere of transatlantic trade fights is likely to
be minimal.").
See The Role of the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act in the
202.
International Competitiveness of the U.S. Companies: Hearing by the Senate Finance
Committee, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://finance.senate.gov (statement of
Robert Zoellick) (noting that the process of legislative response of EU requests is
lengthy, and noting the critical need to expedite the process). See also Thomas Says
Remedy for Foreign Sales Corporations Could Take over Six Months, supra note 157.
Trade Analyst Warns Administration is on Wrong Track with FSC
203.
Negotiations, supranote 172. Mitchell thinks that the European Union will eventually
go forward with imposing sanctions. Id.
See Trade Scene: Trade Policy Alphabet Soup Stew, supra note 1. The
204.
House Ways and Means Committee is evaluating the proposed American
Competitiveness Act of 2002, that repeals the Replacement Law. Robert Branand, New
U.S. Tax Legislation Cracks Down on Loopholes, MODERN PLASTICS, Aug. 1, 2002, at
55. The bill strives to "offset the repeal with other tax breaks." Software Firms Lobby
for an Overseas Tax Break, NAT'L J.'S CONGRESSDAILY, Aug. 6, 2002, available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily.
The House of Representatives began hearings on the issue on April 10,
205.
2002, but thus far legislators have made little or no progress toward an actual solution.
See Exclusion of Foreign Income from U.S. Taxes: HearingBefore the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002). Chairman Thomas said he hopes to have
legislation through the House by October 4, 2002 after legislators return to their
districts from their campaign trips. U.S. House Tax Panel Head Says U.S. Committed
to Changing Tax Law to Meet WTO Rule, AFX NEWS, Apr. 15, 2002. House Speaker
Dennis Hastert, however, seems committed to a continued fight against the WTO
decision. See id. In response, President Bush's chief economic adviser, Lawrence
Lindsey, said that the matter was one best solved by a change in the law. Pro-Trade
Dems Prod Bush on TAA, NAT'L J.'S CONGREssDAILY, Apr. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily.
Impact of Financial and Professional Service Exports on Small Business:
206.
Hearing Before the Comm. on Small Business, supra note 140. This practice is already
exercised at the federal level for whiskey manufacturers who export their goods. Id.
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Wilbur Mills suggested this plan in 1969, but it was rejected because of
the high cost of implementation. 20 7 Today, however, compliance costs
are less of a concern, now that the "benefit on the books already costs
the Treasury [Department] $4 billion.''20 8 Now is the time to give the
excise tax rebate plan full consideration as an option to avoid sanctions
and competitive disadvantage to U.S. goods in the export market.
For example, manufacturers of distilled spirits are currently
exempt from tax on spirits manufactured for export. 20 9 Further, after
applications are filed and bonds are secured, such spirits are free
from export taxes as well. 210 Manufacturers are also exempt from tax
when transferring their goods to foreign trade zones. 211 In general,
there is a tax of $13.50 per proof gallon of distilled spirits produced in
the United States. 212 However, when exported, the goods are free of
tax, making the product less expensive and more competitive in the
global market.21 3 Similarly, the European statutes allow for the
'214
repayment of the tax for "those in business overseas.
Congress could write a similar law for other export industries
that would allow those industries to exempt certain taxes on
exporting their goods. For example, automobiles are subject to a ten
percent excise tax on the first retail sale. 2 15 Congress could waive
this tax for manufacturers who export their vehicles. Such a system
would be in line with current U.S. policy to waive excise taxes for
216
exports.
To fit into Professor McDaniel's model, it is important that the
217
Put
tax be generally applicable with respect to corporations.
another way, the excise tax exemption system cannot be applied only
to industries that the European Union might target for sanctions, nor
can it be applied only to those corporations with the most export
revenue.
Rather, it must be implemented across the board,
regardless of the exporting status or power of the industry. Further,
if excise taxes were generally exempted for all exports for all
industries, the U.S. government would not have the perception
problem that it is foregoing revenue to which it is otherwise

207.
208.
209.
210.
for other

Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 5214(a)(1)(A).
I.R.C. § 5214(a)(4). These products are also eligible for other exemptions
reasons, such as use by a governmental agency for testing.
I.R.C.

§ 5214(a)(2).
211.
I.R.C. § 5214(a)(8).

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

I.R.C. § 5001(a)(1).
See I.R.C. § 5001(a)(4); see also I.R.C. § 5214.
See, e.g., Value Added Tax Act, 1994, c. 23, § 39 (Eng.).
I.R.C. § 4001.
See supra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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entitled. 218 This plan should be acceptable because it is functionally
the same as a VAT because the tax is generally applied, but it is
219
deducted when the goods are exported.
The European Union might challenge this tax plan as one that
only applies to certain activities (exports), arguing that this plan
However, making such an
violates other WTO agreements. 22 0
argument would place the tax systems of EU nations in serious peril.
The United States could argue that this indirect tax plan is
indistinguishable from VAT plans used widely in the European
Union. A tax is levied against a good but is then forgiven when the
good leaves the country. 221 If a VAT is in compliance with the SCM
Agreement, which it is, 22 2 the proposed indirect taxation plan must
also be in compliance, making the indirect taxation plan and the VAT
223
functionally the same.
Further, it could be argued that the excise tax plan is just
another way that the United States would solve the tax problem at
the expense of its sovereignty because it is a functional equivalent to
the EU tax plan. However, for this plan to be implemented, the
United States would not be forced to give up its current worldwide
taxation plan. Rather, this plan fully comports with U.S. taxation
policy and would preserve the system that the United States has
chosen with respect to taxing its citizens and its corporations without
requiring the government to give up revenue otherwise due to it.
The excise tax exemption plan is a viable alternative to the
current system because it does not require overhaul of the tax system,
but it has the same compliance benefits as a VAT system.2 24 It would
satisfy both the competitive needs of U.S. businesses operating
abroad and the desire of tax reform proponents for a new system.
22 5
Though Congress may not relish the thought of rewriting tax law,
it needs to take action to avoid the dire consequences of noncompliance. The excise tax plan is one such action that can allay
most fears regarding national sovereignty -and complications in the
WTO.

See Tax Treatment I, supranote 1, 8.4.
218.
See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 189-90.
219.
See id. See also McDaniel, supra note 13, at 1623 (for Prof. McDaniel's
220.
proposition that the tax must not deviate based on activity regulated).
221.
See supranote 141 and accompanying text.
.222.
See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 18, at 54.
223.
It is important to note that the FSC is economically indistinguishable from
the VAT. However, the excise tax plan looks more similar to the VAT, and would likely
be less subject to challenge than the FSC.
See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 18 (for the proposition that VATs do comply
224.
with WTO standards).
225.
See Zoellick, Rockefeller Butt Heads over Trade Negotiations, supra note
168.
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C. Fourth Time's a Charm-Rewritingthe FSC Legislation
Congress could also go back to the drawing board and rewrite the
FSC legislation once again. 226 Two key aspects of the law must
change in order to bring the United States into compliance. First, the
new tax scheme must not provide for a benefit based on export
227
performance in violation of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
Second, the FSC Replacement Law does not apply to goods produced
in the United States for use in the United States. 228 Exporting must
229
not be "a necessary precondition to qualify for the subsidy."
First, a possible solution is to remove the fifty percent "foreign
content limitation" and requirement that the property be held for use
outside the United States. 23 0 The European Union agreed that the
law would no longer be a prohibited subsidy if those two clauses were
removed.2 3 1 However, removing such language would defeat the
232
purpose of the Replacement Law, which was to encourage exports.
The subsidy could be given to products sold within the United States
as well as products for export, 233 but the U.S. government could ill
afford to forfeit that much tax revenue.
Second, the new tax plan must not violate Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of
the SCM Agreement that prohibits the foregoing of "a government
234
revenue otherwise due" to the government from the corporation.
Therefore, if money is owed to the government, it must collect that
money.2 35 Put another way, Congress cannot carve out a portion of
income and shield it from taxation. 236 The key in this regard is to
avoid a double taxation problem for U.S. businesses operating abroad.
Congress could pass a resolution providing for taxation of export
income by the country where the corporation is a resident. However,
such a resolution would create a situation where every U.S. export
company would set up shop in a tax haven where it would pay zero
tax, depriving the U.S. government of any benefit of the companies'
237
exports.

226.
Experts Advise What to Do Now that WTO Has Shot Down FSC
Replacement Act, supra note 9.
227.
See Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 8.53.
228.
Id. 8.60.
229.
See id. 8.60.
230.
See id. 8.1.
231.
Id.
232.
See Anderson, supranote 11.
233.
Tax Treatment I, supra note 1, 8.72.
234.
See id. 7 8.4.
235.
See id. T 8.9; see also id. 8.17.
236.
Id. TT 8.25-8.26.
237.
See Washington Appeals Against WTO FSC Ruling, supra note 1; see also
Bhala & Gantz, supra note 18, at 54.
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Within Professor McDaniel's construct, any rewrite of the FSC
Replacement Law that retains the original purpose of the laws will be
subject to further challenge. The most significant problem is the lack
of general applicability of the tax. Indeed, the FSC Replacement Law
applied only to exporting corporations. Therefore, the Replacement
Law is in opposition with the McDaniel construct and the WTO
decision. Indeed, through this lens, a mere rewrite of the law on the
books is futile at best and foolish at worst.
The danger in this strategy, amply illustrated above, is that the
attempt to rewrite the legislation to bring it into compliance may
devolve into a "charade" that merely "adopt[s] another version of the
same old tax break. '238 The key to rewriting the statute is to avoid
differential treatment between exports and goods for sale within the
United States. 239 Rewriting the statute in that manner is a heady
240
task that will likely come at great cost of time and money.
Additionally, Congress will not likely wish to undertake such a
task. 241 As House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill
Thomas noted, the United States must do more than "put a patch" on
the FSC legislation. 242 At this stage, rewriting the laws to retain
FSCs does not seem viable or worthwhile.
D. Other Options
Several other options for change, while less attractive than the
aforementioned plans, do bear mention.
1. Leaving the WTO
Some commentators have suggested that the United States could
choose to leave the WTO. 243 Senate leaders have cautioned against
this and have said that "we can't take all of our marbles and go home
just because we disagree with one decision out of the WTO. 24 4
Indeed, pulling out of the WTO would appear highly hypocritical
given that the United States has "vigorously supported" the mandate
of the WTO when the panel decided disputes in its favor. 245 Further,

Impact of Financialand Professional Service Exports on Small Business:
238.
HearingBefore the Comm. on Small Business, supranote 140.
239.
240.

Tax Treatment I, supra note 1,
O'Leary, supra note 38, at 164.

8.72.

See EU/US: Officials Mull Options over WTO Tax Case, supra note 21.
241.
242.
Thomas Says Remedy for Foreign Sales Corporations Could Take over Six
Months, supra note 157.
See WTO Ruling on Export Sales Complicates Trade, Tax Issues, supra note
243.
50.
244.
245.

Id. (quoting Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle).
O'Leary, supra note 38, at 171.
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with the need to work closely with allies against terrorism, 246 the
United States can ill afford to alienate European allies by ending the
U.S. relationship with the WTO. This is true both in terms of
retaining good relationships with allies, and in presenting a united
front in the battle against international terrorism. 24 7 While, in
theory, leaving the WTO would alleviate a drawn-out battle, it is not
a viable solution in practice.
2. Paying the Sanctions
The United States could choose to pay the sanctions authorized
by the WTO. 24s However, given the huge impact that the sanctions
would have on trade, 249 the United States should not seriously
consider this option. In addition to the economic consequences, such
a course also raises concerns with enforcing future decisions in the
WTO against other nations.2 50 Fortunately, given the concerns for
both sides in terms of potential negotiations on the issue, it is
unlikely that this option will be considered or that the situation will
"escalate to this level." 251 Indeed, this is one of the most unwise
courses that the United States could take in response to the WTO
decision.
3. Relinquishing Tax Breaks
Removing all tax breaks from the corporate taxation laws would
also be an ill-advised solution.2 52 While removing all tax breaks
would certainly comply with the WTO ruling, such compliance would
come at too great of a cost. Given the competitive disadvantages that
would accrue, such a,course -would be devastating to U.S. export
performance. 253 It is certain that this option does not present the
solution to the issue.
A spin on this solution is to offer compensation to the European
Union by lowering U.S. tariffs.2 54 Decreasing tariffs might appease
the European Union for a time, and it might also benefit U.S.

246.
WTO Ruling on Export Sales Complicates Trade, Tax Issues, supra note 50.
247.
See id.
248.
Carmichael, supranote 159, at 205.
249.
See infra Part V.
250.
See supranote 149 and accompanying text.
251.
Carmichael, supra note 159, at 206.
Accord Carmichael, supra note 159, at 206.
252.
See, e.g., ExtraterritorialIncome Regieme, Exclusion of Foreign Income:
253.
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures, 107th Cong. (2002),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/srm/107cong/5-9-02/107-77final.htm
available
at
(testimony of Eric M. Engen, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute).
254.
Branand, supra note 103.
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However, the lowered tariffs would harm U.S.
importers. 255
256
producers by forcing them to take a smaller return on their goods.
In short, neither version of a tax break relinquishment will solve the
problem in a satisfactory way.
4. Challenging EU Tax Systems
Governmental officials have suggested the United States might
challenge the European tax systems with which the FSCs were
created to compete. 257 By doing this, foreign laws may also be struck
down, reducing the competitive disadvantage caused by the loss of the
258
The
benefit and the potential sanctions authorized by the WTO.
to
similar
scheme
tax
a
Belgian
identified
already
United States has
U.S.
to
attract
designed
was
that
Law
the FSC Replacement
operations, and such a scheme Would be a likely target for
259
challenge.
However, history cautions against such a tit-for-tat battle. In
1976, nations argued bitterly over differing tax schemes in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), resulting in a
stalemate on tax regulation. 260 The United States should not expose
itself to a situation in which it must depend on other nations to
refrain from challenging its laws. 261 Reactionary challenges would
merely waste time in another bitter dispute that will not accrue any
benefit or provide any clarity as to what is acceptable internationally
with respect to tax codes, and then would merely put the tax code in
2 62
an even worse state of flux.
Further, the WTO has already held that the European VAT
system does meet WTO compliance standards, adding force to the
argument that the United States should not waste time challenging
European VAT systems. 263 Indeed, while such action may
"encourag[e] the sides to reach a compromise solution," it may also

Id.
255.
See id.
256.
See also Bush
America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 2.
257.
Administration May Challenge Tax Codes of Other Countries, BULLETIN'S
FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 28, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Frntrn File.
See Mann, supra note 101.
258.
See Michael Mann, Belgian Tax Break Probed, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at
259.
8.
New, supra note 102.
260.
See Impact of Financial and Professional Service Exports on Small
261.
Business: HearingBefore the Comm. on Small Business, supra note 140 (discussing the
"gentleman's agreement" between the United States and European Union not to
challenge each other's tax laws).
See New, supra note 102; see also Dan Sabbagh, US Loses WTO Tax
262.
Dispute, DAILYTELEGRAPH, Jan. 15, 2002, at 32 (quoting Gary Campkin: "There is now
real potential for a damaging spiral of claimand counter-claim.").
Bhala & Gantz, supra note 18, at 54.
263.
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"increase tensions between the two sides and weaken the
relationship" between the two parties. 264 Given the long history of
the battle over taxation systems, the latter outcome appears more
265
likely.
5. Negotiated Settlement
Finally, the United States and the European Union could
attempt to reach a mutually beneficial settlement. 266 It is important,
however, that such a settlement be more than a mere "gentleman's
agreement," similar to the settlement that existed on the issue of
FSCs until the European Union challenged the Replacement Law in
1999.267 If another trade dispute like the dispute over banana and
beef import regulations occurred, a gentleman's agreement would
potentially deter the U.S. trade representative from bringing
legitimate challenges against foreign laws to the WTO.2 68 If another
EU trade policy warranted challenge, the United States could once
again incur the wrath of the European Union and risk challenge of
269
another U.S. policy.
The current state of the negotiations evinces the problems with
this option.
EU officials wish to use the FSC ruling to gain
concessions from the United States on other trade issues. 270 In
return for concessions on import regulations on bananas and beef, the
European Union would "reduce, delay, or even waive the sanctions
...and. possibly soften its demands for export-tax reform."'27 1 Trade
Representative Zoellick has made veiled threats of his own, hinting
that if the European Union proceeds with sanctions against U.S.
goods, he will challenge "alleged illegal tax breaks" for European

264.
Carmichael, supra note 159, at 208.
265.
See New, supra note 102. See also Stephen Castle, Europe Warns of
Worldwide Trade War over Steel; Commissioner Accuses America of 'Wild West' Tactics
as Leaders Prepare for a Damaging Round of Tit-for-Tat Sanctions, INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Mar. 7, 2002, at 15 ("Asked whether such a reaction [to the steel tariff
decision] from Brussels might spark a damaging round of tit-for-tat trade sanctions,
Lamy replied, 'That danger exists."').
266.
Anderson, supra note 11.
267.
Impact of Financial and Professional Service Exports on Small Business:
HearingBefore the Comm. on Small Business, supra note 140.

268.
Id.
269.
Id. To put it slightly differently, the proposition that "we won't challenge
you if you don't challenge us" will not merely apply to the subsidy issue at hand.
Instead, it will extend further to prevent U.S. challenges on issues that may be of the
utmost importance, such as health standards. See id.
270.
Richard Tomlinson, With Friends Like These.
FORTUNE INT'L, Feb. 4,
2002, at 20.
271.
Id.
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corporations. 272 These statements amply illustrate the fundamental
problem with attempting negotiations on the FSC issue. Such an
arrangement invites another stalemate on trade taxes or other issues
until one party brings another legitimate claim, at which point the
challenged party will bring a claim on this issue to punish the other
party.
The possibility of further aggression is highlighted by the dispute
273
over the recent U.S. decision to impose tariffs on European steel.
Europe and Asia have already filed complaints with the WTO asking
for lower tariffs to compensate for losses of revenue. 274 Further, the
European Union hinted that while it had previously agreed to give
the United States time to change the FSC Replacement Law, with the
275
Put
steel decision "that position may no longer be sustainable.
another way, the European Union may decide to impose sanctions,
despite its previous pledge to delay in doing so, in retaliation for the
tariffs on steel, that the European Union feels are blatantly
protectionist. 276 Though European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy
later stated that the European Union will not link the steel dispute to
the FSC dispute, 277 the United States should not take a chance that it
will become involved in another decades-long war whereby it reaches
another gentleman's agreement and then finds itself in the same
This new twist further
position in another twenty years.
demonstrates the need for a stand-alone solution-one that does not
depend on the good faith of the European Union.
Further, because there is no deadline for imposing ,the
sanctions, 278 the European Union can back out of the deal and- decide
to impose the authorized sanctions against the United States if it
grows weary of the arrangement that was secured in negotiation.
While it may be in the interests of the United States and Europe to
settle the dispute at the bargaining table, 279 it is unlikely 'thaf either
trade representative would be willing to make substantial concessions

272.
Id.
273.
See, e.g., Castle, supra note 265.
274.
Dan Shope, Opposition to. Steel Tariffs Rises from International Trade
Partners;The European Union, China and Japan Strike Back against PresidentBush's
Levies, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Mar. 16, 2002, at A36. All told, the two
disputes could be worth about $6 billion combined. Robert McLeod and Blair Pethel,
EU Readies $6 Bln in U.S. Tariffs in Steel, Tax Feuds, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 15,
2002, LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
275.
Castle, supra note 265.
276.
Id. (statement of Nick Clegg, trade spokesman for the Liberal group in the
European Parliament).
277.
EU to Ask US for Trade Compensation of Same Value as EU Steel Exports,
AFX NEWS, Mar. 6, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Afxnl File. "If I made a link, that
would be escalation." EU/U.S.: Lamy and Bush Play Down Trade Spats, EUR. REP.,
May 25, 2002, 2002 WL 13766061 (quoting Lamy).
278.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
279.
See O'Leary, supra note 38, at 169.
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regarding taxation and sacrifice sovereignty for settlement. 28 0 Given
these considerations, "negotiations in the Doha Round should be a
supplement, not a substitute, for Congressional action. 2 81
Further, the European Union has plainly indicated that it does
not want to negotiate the FSC Replacement Law issue with the full
28 2
membership of the WTO at the next set of trade talks.
Additionally, the incoming director-general of the WTO, Supachai
Panitchpakdi of Thailand, also believes that the dispute should not be
involved in the new round of talks launched in Doha. 28 3 Settlement is
a desirable solution, but not one that is truly viable given what is at
stake for both the United States and the European Union-especially
since "there is little appetite in Washington for further compromise"
28 4
or negotiation.

VII. CONCLUSION
Given all the aforementioned considerations, it is imperative
that the solution to the FSC issue be one that can stand alone, with
or without cooperation from the European Union. 285 With this in
mind, negotiation-suggested by some to be the best solution 2 6should not be seen as, and is not, a panacea. After the long, drawnout battle with the European Union, the United States cannot afford
to depend on the generosity or mercy of its economic adversary.
Rather, it must formulate a solution that first and foremost meets the
needs of its corporations, and that secondly makes a good faith effort
to meet its obligations to the WTO.

280.
See New, supra note 102 (stating the proposition that sovereignty over
taxation systems is a key issue in the WTO appeal).
28i.
WTO' ExtraterritorialIncome Decision, supra note 197 (testimony of Gary
Hufbauer).
282.
Lamy Says EU Will Use All Tools to 'Leverage' US Compliance in WTO Tax
Dispute, AFX NEWS, Jan. 25, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Afxnl File.
283.
WTO's Supachai Says US, EU Should Resolve Tax Row Outside of New
Round, AFX NEWS, Feb. 5, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Afxnl File.
284.
Charlotte Denny, Dollars 4bn US Subsidies Incur WTO's Wrath,
GUARDIAN, Jan. 14,, 2002, at 22. See also Barry James, U.S. and EU Seek to Cool
Trade Fires After Ruling, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 16. 2002, at 1; but see US to
Cooperate with EU after WTO Tax Ruling, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 14, 2002,

2002 WL 2316578 '(stating that the United States is willing to cooperate with the
European Union). Despite this willingness, too much is at stake for the United States
to risk excessively giving up ground in the spirit of international cooperation. See, e.g.,
America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 2 (reporting that the European Union
could impose sanctions of up to $4 billion).
285.
See New, supranote 102.
286.
See O'Leary, supra note 38, at 169.
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While an overhaul of the tax code may be appealing to some, 287
the European Union will not wait forever for compliance. Given the
large agenda that Congress takes on each year, tax reform may fall
by the wayside, provoking the European Union to follow through on
its threat to impose sanctions on the United States. Further, it would
be wise to move on to other issues of concern to the trade community,
rather than challenging other tax regimes in what could lead to an
even longer, more bitter battle that will benefit no one. Given the two
failed attempts to save the FSC Replacement Law, 28 8 rewriting the
legislation is a futile endeavor that could very likely lead to the U.S.
Trade Representative being forced to re-defend the system before the
WTO Panel.
Given these concerns, the best option for the United States is to
attempt to implement an excise tax rebate, similar to the current
model, for foreign income. First, because of its similarity to the VAT
system used in EU countries, an excise tax rebate would be compliant
with WTO standards. Further, although such a plan would be an
intrusion on the sovereignty of the United States, it would not be so
egregious as the violation of sovereignty that would occur if the
United States adopted an entirely different taxation plan-that is,
exchanging its worldwide system for a territorial system. 289 Finally,
the excise tax exemption is a current feature of the U.S. taxation
system. 290 Unlike the FSC plan, this option would not be seen as a
291
departure from the current taxation scheme
A key problem with any legislative package is time lag. Some
lawmakers believe that passing a new Replacement Law could take
more than six months. 292 The European Union wants to be assured
that the United States is 'taking its obligation to cure the problem
seriously. 293 Despite the inevitably long length of time it will take to
push a bill through Congress, the European Union will likely grant
the United States the benefit of the doubt if Congress appears to be
making a serious attempt to comply with the WTO ruling, and would
294
therefore wait before retaliating.

See A Subsidy by Any Other Name, supra note 12.
287.
288.
See generally infra Part III.
See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
289.
290.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
291.
See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
Thomas Says Remedy for Foreign Sales Corporations Could Take over Six
292.
Months, supra note 157.
293.
Id. See also Zoellick, Rockefeller Butt Heads over Trade Negotiations, supra
note 168 (reporting Zoellick's assertion that he would have nmore bargaining power with
the European Union if it "appeared Congress was willing to at least consider [tax]
reform").
294.
See Role of the ExtraterritorialIncome Exclusion Act in the International
Competitiveness of U.S. Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
supra note 203 (indicating that the European Union is not eager to retaliate against
the United States on the FSC issue). See also Carter Dougherty, Lawmakers Struggle
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Another problem specific to the excise tax exemption plan is that
it is a sacrifice of U.S. sovereign power to choose its own taxation
system. Indeed, since there is no functional economic difference
between the U.S. Replacement Law and the European plan, it seems
that the WTO decision creates a double standard by which the WTO
inexplicably shows preference for one of two economically
indistinguishable tax plans. 295 The battle over such a plan will very
obviously depend on the vote in the U.S. Senate, which appears much
less likely than the House of Representatives to accept such an
296
intrusion on sovereignty.
In the final analysis, however, it would be much better to have a
legislative solution created by the United States, as opposed to a
solution essentially crafted by the WTO or, worse yet, by the
European Union. Indeed, negotiation could further intrude on U.S.
sovereignty by forcing the U.S. trade representative to accept a tax
system that fundamentally alters the current tax plan in the United
States. Further, the United States must feel free to bring its own
claims before the WTO, making negotiation less attractive at this
time. With an excise tax exemption similar to the one proposed in
this Note, the United States will maintain its sovereignty by
retaining its worldwide taxation system while adopting an export tax
plan that both complies with the WTO standards and conforms with
its basic taxation model.
As Trade Representative Zoellick noted, "we're now in a world
' ' 297
where they retaliate, we compensate . . . or we change the law.
The European Union recognizes that such a process will take time,
but it will not wait forever. 298 While none of the proposed plans are
ideal for the United States, 299 the excise tax plan has the most trade
benefits with the fewest procedural and substantive problems.
An EU trade official has said that with the WTO ruling, the
European Union has been "given a gun . . . then they [the WTO]
decide how many bullets [we] have. Then, it's up to [the European

to Fix Export-Tax Flaw, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at C9 (paraphrasing Zoellick's call
to Congress to "demonstrate progress in changing the law" to avoid retaliation by the
European Union).
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296.
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supra note 157. House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas speaks in terms of
how long the legislation might take. Id. Indeed, Chairman Thomas is a proponent of
"major changes in the U.S. tax laws." Dougherty, supra note 294. Senate Finance
Chairman Max Baucus, however, opines, "I don't think [a legislative solution is] going
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Dougherty, supra note 294 (ellipses in original).
297.
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Union] to decide whether to pull the trigger, and what size bullets [to]
use. But [we are] completely free as to whether to use the gun or
not. '300 In plotting a future course of action, the United States must
be prepared for the European Union to use that gun against the
United States and U.S. corporations. If sanctions are imposed, the
effect on the U.S. economy will be catastrophic. Indeed, it could have
nuclear proportions that cannot fully be comprehended at this stage.
The United States must be prepared to defend against this most dire
consequence. Now, trade officials and lawmakers must ensure that
U.S. interests are well-defended against any weapon that the
European Union chooses to use. Changing the way that corporations
are taxed on their exports is an important preparatory step.
CarrieAnne Von Hof(

Allen Nacheman, EU Awaits WTO Word on "Bullets" for Trade Sanctions
300.
Against U.S., AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 15, 2002, 2002 WL 2317372. Another
official preferred to talk in terms of "flowers, not bullets." Id. Most, however, see the
EU threat of sanctions as a weapon. See James, supra note 284, (characterizing the
victory as giving the European Union "a big stick to beat the United States with").
Indeed, Commissioner Lamy himself stated, "[I]f anyone out there wants to gamble on
compliance on the basis that they don't think retaliation is a likely outcome, all I can
say is that that would be very dangerous indeed. I don't think I need say any more
than that, at this stage." Pascal Lamy, Remarks by European Commissioner for Trade
Pascal Lamy at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Jan. 25, 2002),
available at http://wwics.si.edu/NEWS/speeches/lamy.htm.
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